I take it as an axiom (in the sense of a principle of intrinsic merit and not in the sense of a self-evident proposition), that I have a duty to love my neighbours, which requires me at the least to wish their good. If I want or feel obliged to come under pressure to go beyond that minimum and actually do something to promote their good, then, again at the least, I have a duty to ascertain what their good actually is. That duty predicates a right to investigate the matter, do some research on it, in order to avoid mistaking it. For simple instance, if a neighbour is in a poverty trap and I wish to participate in his liberation, I must at least ascertain how the trap can be sprung without damaging him further. The absurdities of ignorant charity have long been the butt of academic and cynics alike.
The right to investigate is reinforced from a second source, namely natural curiosity. In recent centuries, indeed, the cultivation of this has become more and more firmly enshrined as a function of enlightened education. Its pursuit has attracted incalculable investment. Curiosity is the engine by which we have reached the outer planets. At the same time, nowhere does it flourish more vigorously than in knowing about our neighbour's businessand interfering with it. We need discipline to keep out of each others' affairs. Whether curiosity and meddlesomeness predicate a universal human right to infOrmation, investigation and reflection is doubtful in logic, but irresistible in practice. The very elegance of Pope's apothegm, 'the proper study of mankind is man' underscores how hard we work to legitimise that from which we cannot desist.
I assume development studies to be about people and about their well-being. Clearly, I also assume that the idea of neighbour encompasses a great many more folk than the family next door and invades all sorts of boundaries, political, cultural, linguistic and racial. Further, I attempt partially to.
legitimise curiosity by bracketing it with love and, in doing so, give development studies a moral colouring.
Yet the two are obviously separable. While the wise practice of love may require the exercise of some restricted curiosity, the practice of curiosity does not require the motive of love. The recent recrudescence of concern for participatory research and denunciations of academic imperialism suggest that it is only too easy for curiosity to displace love. In development studies, then, as in other fields of enquiry, love of one's neighbour is not of the essence of the arteven though it may be the initial motive propelling a particular individual into the field. Whether the separation of the two, the adoption of a 'purely' academic stance, promises good, evil or irrelevance to sound development studies, is an issue which will nöt be pursued further here. Sooner or later one has to resort to definitions; let me indicate roughly what I now mean by development studies. They comprise systematic attempts to understand, on the one hand, how and why nation states and their subordinate social organisms attempt, succeed or fail in increasing the wealth, improving the well-being and widening the rights and opportunities available to their members; and, on the other, how nation states and other agents in international relationshipssuch as transnational corporationshelp, obstruct or exploit each other in the said success and failure.
Such a formulation suggests a pure or academic form of development studies, which has no ambition beyond understanding. It suggests, too, that all nation states are treated with equal attention in both sections of the division. Both suggestions would probably have been missing from any attempt I might have made, say, 15 years ago. Then I would most likely have said that development studies were about developing developing countries. My emphasis would have been intensely practical or applied, the international dimension would have been lacking, there would have been no hint that the developed countries were in any way still developing, and there would instead have been a firm, if tacit, assumption that they were the major repositories of development wisdofri. I suspect that the question of the title would be put by a person still operating on this older definition and taking no account of the evolution of development thinking.
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Yet such a person might well argue that my repentant formulation unhappily does not fit still current facts, while the old one does. Most courses of development studies, he might allege, still focus and are expected to focus on implications for policy, planning, programmes and projects. They are justified less as education and more as training. While theory is acknowledged to be important, the emphasis is on application. Development studies is still very much a stamping ground for people concerned, and often paid, to promote their neighbours' good, not simply to think about it.
Second, the policy and programmes are in bulk not applicable equally to developed and less developed states, but refer mainly to the latter. The actual operating bias, if not principle, is that, whatever the role of the developed countries, development happens in the developing ones. Attention is indeed given to the impact of rich country policies upon the poor. Relatively little is given to the effects of the poor upon the rich, or even of the rich upon each other. Development studies, as taught today, are substantially a specialisation in the current internal development of the poorer states of the world.
Third, the hollowness of my updated definition is demonstrated by the very population of the courses on development studies. If these courses were equally concerned with developed and developing countries, the students on them would probably reflect the composition of the student body in Britain. On undergraduate courses, students from developing countries might account for some 10 per cent of the enrolment, while among postgraduates, they might make up perhaps a third. The figures provided to Deryke Belshaw turn that supposition upside down [IDS forthcoming 1980] . On the postgraduate courses listed in his paper, almost 90 per cent of the enrolment is drawn from developing countries. The upshot of the allegation is that actual courses on development studies have not caught up with development thinking. They still carry their historical legacy in orientation, focus and population. Even if this were true, would it indicate that such courses in Britain should be abolished?
Let me oppose myself and start on an answer with an obvious observation. It may well be that directors and teachers of development studies studiously eschew prescription, focusing instead intently on issues, options and techniques useful in assessing alternatives. Nevertheless, those who offer to teach or, even more modestly, to guide study must needs have some advantage over those who come to learn on courses. Those who teach development studies must have some comparative advantage in learning about development. In the current context of Britain's courses, the insinuation is that people from developing countriesplus a minority of otherscan learn about their own conditions as effectively, possibly more effectively in Britain than in their own countries. The truth of this can be left for later discussion.
Wrapped up in that first insinuation is another.
Since the courses are taught in the main by British lecturers, possibly with the assistance of a few tame refugees from developing countries, it must be supposed that the British have a comparative advantage in understanding developing societies. To be sure, the legacy of empire includes a number of people who did actually work in villages, run government machinery and design all manner of development programmes. And there are people who formed the steady flow of technical cooperators under a variety of bilateral and multilateral programmes, and other people who simply undertook their own research. Even so the stock of possible teachers of development studies does seem to be dwindling, and with it the comparative advantage. So development studies as practised heretofore should be shrinking and in the process of transforming its content and student body.
Yet, miraculously, the numbers of courses in development studies is on the increase. This paradox may be a manifestation of one of Parkinson's Laws. Equally, it may be the logical evolution of a vested interest. Because of the original advantage, some courses were set up. Because of the courses, more British people got themselves involved in developing countries and so more courses were generated. Consequently, even more British steep themselves in development and then purport to have acquired a comparative advantage. The self-perpetuation of a profession is under way.
The process would be unexceptionablewho worries after all that American scholars teach European history in America to American students?but for the fact that development studies are not taught in the main to the students of developed countries. What this suggests is that courses in development studies in Britain are in direct and active competition with similar potential or actual courses in developing countries. This competitiveand obversely depressivepower is reinforced by the support they receive for their faculty and students from the British aid budget. On Belshaw's information, some 40 per cent of the students who are in development studies and from developing countries are financed by Britain. The unequal competition is skewed even more by other advantages, internal and external, enjoyed by institutions in rich countries. In short, there is a case for supposing that development studies, as currently taught in Britain, are underdeveloping development studies in developing countries themselves.
At the same time, they are using the developing countries to maintain their competitive advantage. Their faculty are encouraged to work from time to time in such states, so as to replenish their professional capital, as well as their operational funds.
Second, many of the courses require their rich country students to have had experience of work in developmentbut not development in rich countries. In other words, the developing countries are expected to permit tyros to thrash about among their problems, possibly with some benefit to themselvesmost go on permitting itbut certainly with benefit to both the numerical force of the professional cadre and to its range of expertise.
A further snide observation can be made in parenthesis about the minorities of rich country students. Some of them enter the pool from which the agencies of international aid recruit their permanent professional cadres. Since the posts available have to be distributed among the member nationalities on bases other than the degree to which they require aid, the rich countries can consolidate their position by claiming to have properly qualified people on offer. On the other hand, it is an easy riposte that as the rich countries would keep their shares anyway, better that their candidates should be more rather than less qualified.
Taken together, these three points indicate a classic charge of exploitation: giving a sop in return not just for large profit but actually for stunting him who accepts the sop. How just is such a view? I find myself reluctant to credit that any competition there may be is deliberate or concerted. On the contrary, getting resources for courses in development studies seems to have been arduous and uncertain. From an historical perspective, the hypothesis of filling a vacuum strikes me as more plausible. Although training courses of many kinds have existed since 1945, courses in development studies as such are almost a phenomenon of the 1970s. Also they tend to be a phenomenon of the richer countries. Which prompts a paraphrase of Holtham's and Haziewood's remarks on educational aid to Kenya: would a lack of initiative in Britain have meant more and better development studies in developing countries, or even less and worse? [Hoitham and Haziewood 1976: 2531 An answer to the question may be implicit in another part of Belshaw's information lIDS forthcoming 1980: their students the full potential benefit of what they purport to be offering. More snidely, by opening vistas and shutting off continuing contact with reality, they may even be deepening a sense of inadequacy in their students and hence perpetuating a dependence on the profession of development studies.
The teachers may counter by arguing either that their students use their remembrances of things past as satisfactory surrogates for immediate dialectic with reality; or that it is the responsibility of the students to adapt what has been learned to particu-Finally, what of the problem of cultural dependence? Institutions of development studies are not independent of their social and ideological matrices.
British courses in the area are bound then to be biased towards rich country perspectives on development processes. Will they not tutor their students to adopt their views? Might this not lead, as it has in areas like architecture, to inappropriateeven harmfulproposals and policies? In response, I am driven to ask whether the students selected for development studies are uniformly docile morons, incapable of independent assessment. And whether their tutors are monolithic, unswerving indoctrinators. People are indeed influenced by each other: that is part of the human condition. But people also react against each other. What makes for imitation and what for rebellion? Somewhere those who teach have to put their trust in the intelligence, good sense and autonomy of at least some of their students. Otherwise we desist not only from courses in development studies, but from all courses.
